Legal Problems of Artificial Insemination by Radler, George D.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 39
Issue 2 Fall 1955 Article 5
Legal Problems of Artificial Insemination
George D. Radler
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
George D. Radler, Legal Problems of Artificial Insemination, 39 Marq. L. Rev. 146 (1955).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol39/iss2/5
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
An American court for the first time through Judge Gorman, sit-
ting in Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois, has taken a definite
stand on the legal issues involved in Artificial Insemination.
Homologous Artificial Insemination (when the specimen of
semen used is obtained from the husband of the woman) is not
contrary to public policy and good morals, and does not present
any difficulty from the legal point of view.
Heterologous Artificial Insemination (when the speciment of
semen used is obtained from a third party or donor) with or
without the consent of the husband is contrary to public policy
and good morals, and constitutes adultery on the part of the
mother. A child so conceived is not a child born in wedlock and
therefore is illegitimate. As such it is the child of the mother,
and the father has no right or interest in said child.1
This decision has aroused a considerable amount of apprehension
in the homes containing such clinically produced children.2 The time
for appeal from the foregoing decision will soon lapse, therefore,
there is little hope that this case will result in a decision by the Illinois
appeal court. The country must await another case, or legislative action,
before the course of the law will be developed.
At the present time there are no statutes declaring the act of arti-
ficial insemination to be lawful or unlawful, nor determining the status
or rights of the children produced. Bills have been introduced in the
legislatures of at least six states3 to declare such children legitimate if
conceived with the consent of the husband. Because of the conflicting
public opinion toward the practice, in all likelihood the legislatures
will hesitate to take action in the near future, but will allow the courts
to set some precedents.
The court decisions to date are few. The social stigma, resulting
from the practice, forces the parents to keep secret the infants origin.
The problem is of instant importance in cases of divorces on the grounds
of adultery, and situations involving custody of the child. The majority
of litigation will not arise until the death of a parent requires the dis-
position of property. Participating relatives will not be too prone to
protect the social and legal standing of the "test tube" issue.
Artificial Insemination is the introduction of semen into the female
reproductive tract by mechanical means in order to effect pregnancy
without sexual intercourse. 4
1 Doornbos v. Doornbos, N. 54 S. 14981 (Superior Ct., Cook Co. Dec. 13, 1954).
2 Estimations that there were at least 9000 children alive in the U.S. in 1940
produced by artificial insemination, Israel, The Scope of Artificial Insemina-
tion in the Barren Marriage, 202 Am. J. Med. Sci. 92 (1941), and 20,000 by
1951, Plowscowe, Sex and the Law, 113 (1951).
3 Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, New York, Virginia, and Wisconsin.




Artificial Insemination in which the husband's semen is used is
referred to as A.I.H., and that in which a donor's semen is used is
termed A.I.D.5 The reported cases are in accord in holding that A.I.H.
produces few legal problems because the husband is also the biological
or natural father.6 However, an unusual situation is created when
artificial insemination is the medical answer to the impotency of the
husband, and this same impotency is the ground for an annulment ac-
tion by the wife.7 An English court granted a decree of nullity to the
wife on the grounds of impotency of the husband thereby illegitimizing
a child produced through A.I.H. even though the husband was the
natural father.8 The logical solution to this problem came in 1953 when
the English court stated that if a wife had sufficient realization of her
position in law regarding the impotency of her husband when she had
the insemination treatments, such treatments might have amounted to
an approbation of the marriage, thereby barring her from an annul-
mentY The solution is strengthened by the fact that the insemination
in this later case was A.I.D. rather than A.I.H.. A.I.H. treatments give
rise to stronger arguments in favor of a bar to annulment actions on the
grounds of impotency than A.I.D. treatments. When the sperm of the
husband is united with the ova of the wife the marriage is consum-
mated, although not in the normal method. In most of the states an
answer to the question of the legitimacy of the child may be provided
by statutes that legitimize the issue of all marriages declared null in
law.10 It is not to be doubted that the legislatures did not have this
anomaly in mind at the time of the passage of the statutes, but it would
appear that these statutes are broad enough to cover an A.I.H. child
but not an A.I.D. child.
A.I.D. presents two basic problems: What is the legal status of the
child? Does the act itself constitute adultery for the purposes of crim-
inal prosecution or dissolution of the marriage?
STATUS OF THE CHID
"(Illegitimate children) ... are such children as are not born either
in lawffil wedlock or within a competent time after its determination.""
"The term 'born out of wedlock' arises because of the presumption
which attaches to the children born to a man and woman married to
each other, and includes children, whose parents are not, and have not
been, married to each other regardless of the marital status of either
5A.I.H., Artificial Insemination with Husband's semen; A.I.D., Artificial
Insemination with a Donor's semen.
6 "Homologous Artificial Insemination . . . does not present any difficulty from
the legal point of view." Supra, note 1.
735 Am. Jur. 256.8 R.E.L. v. E. L., (1949) P. 211, 1 All. E. R. 141.
9 Slater v. Slater, (1953) P. 235, 1 All. E. R. 246.
-0 Wis. Stats. (1953) §245.36.
In Re Paterson's Estate, 34 Cal. App.2d 305, 93 P.2d 825 (1939).
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parent with respect to another."'12 Thus the legitimacy of a child con-
ceived through the natural method of effectuating pregnancy rests upon
the existence of a marital bond between the natural parents. The ex-
tension of the application of this test to encompass children produced
through clinical impregnation depends upon the reasoning behind the
test, and the application of the reasoning to this method.
The concepts of "legitimacy of the child" and "adultery" are in-
exorably intertwined, in that every child conceived through adultery,
fornication, or comparable crime against morality, is illegitimate. The
term "adultery" as used under this heading is not restricted to any
statutory or judicial definition for the purpose of prosecution or di-
vorce, but rather embraces all acts which effectuate conception and are
offenses contrary to the unity of marriage. For purposes of clarifica-
tion this concept will be labeled "adultery in effectu."
An evaluation of the essence and purpose of marriage is essential
to a clearer understanding of the scope of this concept. Marriage is
the permanent,'3 voluntary union of one man and one woman,' 4 suitably
ratified, 25 for the purpose of procreation and education of children ;16
and secondarily, the preservation of mutual moral and social purity.27
The two elements under instant scrutiny for purposes of this article
are; marriage is restricted to but one man and one woman, to the ex-
clusion of all others, for the prime purpose of procreation. Therefore,
a voluntary union of any alien male sperm, i.e., sperm of any man
other than the husband, with the ova of the wife violates one of the
essential characteristics of marriage, to-wit, the union of one man and
one woman. As far as the effect, or result, of the insemination, it re-
sults in the union between a wife and a man not her husband. Her act
is adultery "in effectu"-the child is not born in, but out of wedlock.' s
The primary objection to this statement of reasoning is based on
the theory that no wrong is committed unless carnal pleasures are taken,
and that adultery demands moral turpitude. 9 If such reasoning were
12 State v. Coliton, 73 N.D. 582, 17 N.W.2d 546 (1945).
23 "(The marriage) . . . being established, the power of the parties as to its ex-
tent or duration is at an end." Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 481 (1863).
'4Nachimson v. Nachimson, Court of Appeal (1931) P. 217, 99 L.J.P. 104, 143
L.T. 254.
25 Amsterdam v. Amsterdam, 56 N.Y.S2d 19 (1945).
26 ,.. . therefore the primary and most legitimate object of wedlock, the pro-
creation of issue . . ." Brown v. Brown, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 523 (1828).
"The essential purpose is the establishment of the conventional home and
family with children." Rubman v. Rubman, 251 N.Y. Supp. 474 (1931).
"The mere fact that the law provides that physical incapacity for sexual rela-
tionship shall be ground for annulling a marriage is of itself a sufficient in-
dication of the public policy that such relationship shall exist with the result
and for the purpose of begetting offspring." Mirizio v. Mirizio, 242 N.Y. 74,
150 N.E. 605 (1926).7 Supra, note 15.
Is Supra, note 1.
'9 The Socio-Legal problems of Artificial Insemination, 28 Ind. L. J. 626 (1953).
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to be extended, it would follow that the child of an unmarried woman
would be legitimate if produced through A.I.D. because no immoral
physical license was involved, and that a child could be conceived by
an unmarried woman by means other than adultery or fornication.
Such a child could be no more legitimate than one conceived through
illicit intercourse. The fact that the woman is married or not is im-
material because marriage grants such marital rights only as between
the contracting parties, 20 thus the wife has no more right to consent to,
nor the husband any right to condone the clinical impregnation of the
wife, than they would have to an act of sexual intercourse between the
wife and the third party donor. Unless the natural parents of the child
are husband and wife, the marital status of the parties merely deter-
mines whether the act is adultery or fornication.
Prior to the Doornbos case, on only two other occasions has the
status of the child been discussed, and then only as dicta. In 1921 a
Canadian court granted a divorce to the husband on the grounds of
adultery.21 The action was brought by the wife for alimony, and the
husband counterclaimed alleging adultery and delivery of a child even
though the marriage had never been consummated because of the
physical inability of the wife. The wife claimed the child was con-
ceived through artificial insemination without the knowledge of the
husband. Actual intercourse on the part of the wife with a third party
was found, but the court stated that if the child had been produced
through A.I.D., this form of impregnation would also be adulterous.
Adultery is the invasion of the marital rights of the husband
or wife. Adultery consists, not in the moral turpitude of the
act of sexual intercourse, but in the voluntary surrender to
another person of the reproductive powers or faculties of the
guilty person...
Grasping for a legal basis to support this public policy and sense of
moral justice, the court quoted the purpose supporting the common
law action of criminal conversation; "Because in the case of the woman
it involves the possibility of introducing into the family of the husband
a false strain of blood."
In a custody proceeding between a wife and husband involving the
rights of the defendant-husband to visit the artificially produced child,
the New York Supreme Court declared that the husband had the same
rights of visitation of a child produced through A.I.D. with the consent
of the husband as that acquired by a foster parent who had formally
adopted the child, and that such a child was not illegitimate.2 2 The
court came to this conclusion by a strained analogy to the procedure of
the legitimizing statutes. It stated:
20 55 C.J. 809.
2lOrford v. Orford, 49 Ont. L. R. 15, 58 D.L.R. 251 (1921).
22 Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1948).
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The child has been potentially adopted or semi-adopted (by the
consent of the husband to the impregnation).... The situation is
no different than that pertaining in the case of a child born out
of wedlock who by law is made legitimate upon the marriage
of the interested parties.
The court overlooked a distinguishing feature of the legitimizing statutes
in that an illegitimate child is made legitimate by the statute if its
natural parents are subsequently married.2 3 These statutes could not
apply to legitimize an A.I.D. child since the parties are married prior
to the insemination and the husband is not a natural parent. The pro-
vision was designed to apply in an entirely different situation.
The terms "potentially adopted or semi-adopted" are without legal
meaning since adoption procedures are strictly statutory,24 and no
attempt had been made to comply with the provisions in the Strnad
case. Seemingly the terms were picked at random to justify a solution
which is not grounded in law, but which has a certain specious validity.
An inference of illegitimacy and legal wrong prior to the so-called
"potential adoption" is presented through the analogy to the legitimizing
statutes-indeed otherwise the statutes would not be mentioned. Thus
the court inferentially expressed an opinion against the propriety of
procreation by this medium.
The Strnad case should not be mistakenly interpreted as condoning
the clinical impregnation with a donor's semen when the husband's
consent is given. The court expressly stated that the decision in no
way encompassed the legality or morality of the method itself. The
husband's consent has no more effect in legitimizing the child than the
approval of a husband in justifying a wife's illicit intercourse with a
third party.
When the contracting parties have entered into a married
state, they have not so much entered into a contract as into a
new relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest
not upon their agreement, but upon the general law of the State,
statutory or common, which defines and prescribes those rights,
duties and obligations. They are of law, not of contract. It was
of contract that the relation should be established, but being
established, the power of the parties as to their extent or dura-
tion is at an end. Their rights under it are determind by the
will of the sovereign as evidenced by law. They can neither be
modified nor changed by any agreement of parties.
25
From the foregoing statements it is clear that there is but a single
test for the legitimacy of a child-the existence of a marital bond be-
23 Wis. Stats. (1953) §245.36. "In any and every case where the father and
mother of an illegitimate child or children shall lawfully intermarry ... such
child or children shall thereby become legitimated ..."
24 "It seems clear that there must be a substantial compliance with statutory
provisions." 1 Am. Jur. 626.
25 Supra, note 13.
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tween the natural parents. The basis of the test for legitimacy is
grounded in the fulfillment of prime purpose of marriage, viz. the
procreation of offspring through the marital union, rather than in the
existence or absence of moral turpitude involved in the method of
conception. An application of this test to a child produced through
A.I.D., with or without the consent of the husband, results in illegiti-
macy.
STATUTORY ADULTERY
There is little danger that any of the parties connected in any man-
ner with the clinical impregnation of a woman, with her consent, with
the semen of a donor, not her husband, can be subject to criminal pros-
ecution, or that the wife may be divorced on the grounds of adultery
under the present interpretation of the law.26
There was no criminal action for adultery under common law2 7
and divorce on the grounds of adultery was encompassed in ecclesiasti-
cal law,2 which body of law was not taken over in this country. Thus
a criminal prosecution for adultery and divorce on this ground must
be based on statute.
The criminal statutes in this field provide punishment for two dis-
tinct classes of acts: (1) adulterous cohabitation, and (2) the com-
mission of adultery.29 It is evident that there could be no conviction in
a state having the former type of statute since intercourse and continu-
ing cohabitation are required.30 Under the latter class a single act of
adultery is sufficient.31 However in all states the legislatures have left
to the courts the interpretation and determination of what constitutes
adultery. The universal rule has been evolved that "to constitute an
offense there, of course, must be an actual contact of the sexual organs
and a penetration into the body of the female, the insertion of the male
organ to some extent into the female organ.1 32 Since this essential
element is absent in artificial impregnation, A.I.D. could not be included
in any present construction of the criminal statute against adultery.33
The same element of penetration and connection is necessary for
adultery as a ground for divorce so the same conclusion can be drawn. 34
In addition a continued cohabitation between the married couple sub-
26Supra, -note 4.
271 Am. Jur. 685.
28 9 R.C.L. 244.
2974 A.L.R. 1361.
30 Quartemas v. State, 48 Ala. 269 (1872).31 State v. Byrunm, 60 Neb. 384, 83 N.W. 207 (1900).
32 State v. Warner, 79 Vt 500, 291 Pac. 307 (1930) ; and others to the same effect;
Maxey v. State, 66 Ark. 523, 52 S.W.2d (1899); People v. Courier, 79 Mich.
366, 44 N.W. 571 (1890).3 3 Hoch v. Hoch, Chicago Sun (Feb. 10, 1945); Time Magazine 58 (Feb. 26,
1945) to the effect that A.I.D. could not be included in a definition of adultery.
34 "In the law of divorce 'adultery' is the voluntary sexual intercourse of a mar-
ried person with one not the husband or wife of that person." Johnson v.
Johnson, 78 N.J.Eq. 507, 80 Atl. 119 (1911).
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sequent to the clinical impregnation could constitute condonation to
bar the action providing that the husband knew of or consented to the
insemination at the time of the later cohabitation.3 5
CONCLUSION
A child produced through artificial insemination with the semen of
the husband is legitimate. Any child produced through clinical im-
pregnation with the sement of a donor, with or without the consent of
the husband, is illegitimate. None of the parties (wife, husband, donor,
or doctor) are subject to criminal prosecution for adultery. The wife
cannot be divorced on the ground of adultery.
No court, other than the Illinois court in the Doornbos case,3 6 has
squarely met the problem or come to a semblance of a conclusion, nor
is there a likely possibility of another such decision in the near future
because of judicial aversion to meeting new questions of law. This
problem should be resolved in the law by legislative action, and would,
in all probability result in the following: (1) a declaration that an
A.I.D. child is legitimate and a legalization of insemination methods
by setting up health and safety standards to control its operation, or
(2) a declaration that an A.I.D. child is illegitimate and an inclusion of
the practice of clinical insemination with a donor's semen without the
knowledge or consent of the husband within the grounds for divorce.
It is not likely that any criminal penalties would be imposed because of
the existent wide-spread practice and since the prosecution for adultery
is primarily designed as a means toward punishment for moral turpi-
tude.
In all probability both courses of action will be adopted in one state
or the other depending upon the popular ideas of morality existing in
such states since the basis for any legislative action in this field is public
policy37-- that principle of law which demands that no individual act
in any manner against the public good.
The unity of the marriage state is of prime consideration to the
public interest since the family is the basic unit in, society. Any inter-
ference with the unity of marital life is a threat to the public good and
is contrary to public policy. A.I.D. breaches this unity through the in-
troduction of a foreign male sperm into the ova of the wife.
Illegitimate children are a burden and care to the state, and result
from an act which is a blot on any civilized moral code. An A.I.D. child
is illegitimate since the impregnation produces a union between the gen-
erative powers of a wife and a man not her husband.
The public good demands that true records of all births be kept for
purposes of inheritance, and to prevent intermarriage within the same
35 19 C.J. 85.
36 Supra, note 1.
37 Supra, note 1.
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family. Since the majority of the plans for legalization of the method
provide for the secrecy of the donor's name, and that the birth cer-
tificate be made out in the husband's and wife's name, there wil be
many misapplications of the laws of inheritance through ignorance of
the real father, and a possibility of marriage between brother and sister
since a donor could father many children of diverse women.
The method of securing the sperm-masturbation-is subject to
strict censure and certainly tends to lower the standard of moral life
in the community. It is true that there are other approved methods of
securing sperm, but they are not ordinarily used.
The above reasons form the basic objections to A.I.D. On the
other side of the scale is found the joy of a barren couple in raising a
family. Let us hope for the public good that when the decision is made,
reason will outweigh this twinge of humanism and the sterile couple
will be left to the normal procedures of adoption.
GEORGE R "L
